Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP86T0	
	F12.E 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency	
Washington, D. C. 20505	DATE 10/03/86 FILE DOC NO ALA M 86-20050
Washington, D.C. 2000	OIR3
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE	P & PD
1 October 1986	
Mexico's Stance on Bilateral Commercial Negot	iations
Summary	
to the negotiating table to discuss a bilateral commercial agreem States that will provide a framework for trade and financial dealing dispute settlement procedures, and guidelines for investment. Personally signaled his desire to seek a broad-based commercial United States last year by reversing a regulation detrimental to Uthat had obstructed bilateral talks. The nationalistic leanings of members and opposition from interest groups, however, probably agreement the government will accept and will complicate the new believe that the Mexicans would be willing to agree to consusettlement procedures and to fold intellectual property rights into they are pressed on foreign investment, they are likely to balk.	ngs, consultation and resident de la Madrid la greement with the JS pharmaceutical firms some key cabinet y limit the scope of the egotiations. On balance, ltation and dispute
Introduction	
After a year-long hiatus, Mexican officials have committed the the negotiating table to discuss a bilateral commercial agreement w that will provide a framework for trade and financial dealings, consusettlement procedures, and guidelines for investment. Negotiations touch on a broad range of specific trade and investment issues, inclagricultural and manufactured goods, intellectual property rights, and laws.	ith the United States Itation and dispute on the agreement will uding trade barriers on
This memorandum was prepared by Mexico Brand America-Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American request of Ann Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the West Department of Commerce. Questions and comments may be directly the second	Analysis, at the ern Hemisphere at the
Mexico Branch	86-20050 25X1
ALA IVI	25X1

1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707430001-9	
	25 X 1
Mexico has made some headway in removing major trade irritants with the United States in the last year. Most notably, the government signed a subsidies agreement calling for the gradual elimination of illegal export subsidies, it backed away from tightening restrictions on the operations of US pharmaceuticals, and it added a large number of products to the list of imports exempt from permits. A number of problem areas remain, however, the most difficult being regulations on patents and trademarks that have effectively allowed Mexican firms to copy US products, restrictions on foreign investment, local content requirements, and export performance requirements.	
	20/(1
Giving Ground on Intellectual Property Rights	
with changes in patent and trademark laws.	25X1
	25X1 25X1
The government also presented draft amendments on the inventions and trademarks law to the Mexican Senate in mid-September. If enacted, these amendments would go far beyond de la	25 X 1
Madrid's 1985 decision to overturn a regulation prohibiting US drug firms from using brand names and forcing them to disclose trade secrets.	25X1
the changes will protect both the process of manufacturing a product and the end product.	
In large measure, the revisions are primarily aimed at protecting pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, but they also will cover other products, such as chemicals, previously	
excluded from patent rights.	25 X 1
Under the proposed patent law, firms reportedly will gain rights enabling them to prevent piracy of their products. Manufacturers will be able to obtain compulsory licensing that will prevent other firms from copying their products and to seek injunctions against companies suspected of breaking the law. The draft law proposes some tough sanctions—the government could close down plants for two weeks as a warning and could shut plants permanently if violations continued. In addition, the new law makes it easier to prove that patent and trademark rights have been infringed by permitting firms to present the products as evidence in court.	25 X 1
According to one legal association, the proposal may provide only nominal protection	207(1
because of several loopholes. Compulsory licensing and injunctions are in fact very difficult	
to obtain in Mexico. Moreover, ambiguous wording may allow "pirate" firms to interpret the law to their advantage.	25 X 1
	207(1
Dim Prospects for Changing Investment Laws	
Mexican willingness to negotiate on intellectual property rights is not likely to be matched by a similar attitude on foreign investment.	25X1
while at least some government officials believe relaxing foreign investment	25 X 1
restrictions is critical to revitalizing Mexico's economy, the protectionist bent of key members of the Cabinet—as well as of business and leftwing opposition—make significant	
changes in foreign investment rules unlikely.]
	25X1
	25X1
2	•
2	

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707430001-9	
	25X1
	25 X 6
In our opinion, a wariness towards foreign investment and a desire to prevent multinationals from driving local firms out of the market are likely to remain the underpinnings of Mexico's investment policy. Despite some steps taken two years ago to chip away at administrative delays and to lower barriers on foreign investment in priority sectors, the government has authorized only a handful of US investments with more than a 50 percent US share. Mexico also has recently allowed 100 percent Japanese ownership of several plants. Nevertheless, we believe these moves are in line with previously-announced policies to allow majority foreign ownership only in a limited number of sectors where the Mexicans seek foreign technology, such as electronics and chemicals, and subject to numerous constraints. At the same time, Mexico has imposed higher local content and export performance requirements that hinder foreign investors. The government shows no signs of permitting majority foreign ownership in other sectors, such as banking, insurance, and brokerage, which are politically sensitive and where fledgling Mexican firms would have difficulty competing with multinationals. The Mexicans reportedly are drawing up explicit regulations on foreign investment in order to eliminate some of the vagaries discouraging multinationals from investing in Mexico. In some cases, the rules for what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable foreign investments in electronics, for instance, overlap. Foreign investors, unsure of how the rules	25X1
will be applied, opt not to invest. If Mexico follows through, the regulations could at least clear up uncertainties and contradictions in the government's policy.	25 X 1
Mexico is almost certainly coming to the talks with the hope of making inroads into the US market. The collapse of oil prices has prompted Mexico to strive to diversify and increase non-petroleum exports, particularly to the United States, Mexico's most important trading partner. Last year's subsidies agreement went part of the way towards achieving this goal by obtaining a US commitment to assess whether US firms are injured by Mexican exports before applying countervailing duties and anti-dumping margins. In exchange, the Mexicans promised to phase out export subsidies.	25 X 1
Mexico City has moved further to encourage trade since the signing of the subsidies agreement. It has eased import licensing restrictions, lowered tariffs, joined the GATT, and drawn up a revised patent and trademarks law. These steps will markedly increase US exporters' access to the Mexican market and improve protection afforded to US manufacturers. Some will entail costs to Mexico because inefficient Mexican firms will find it difficult to survive in a more open market. Mexican officials probably view these changes as bargaining chips for extracting additional agreements from the United States, such as promises not to impose new tariffs or non-tariff barriers, a rollback of US countervailing duties on Mexican exports, and easier access for such Mexican goods as textiles, auto parts, steel, meat, tuna, and sugar. Mexico may also want to recover some of the tariff concessions it lost during the last review of the Generalized System of Preferences.	
concessions it lost during the last review of the deficialized System of Freierences.	25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707430001-9		
	25X1	

Divisions within the Cabinet

Opposition to a wide-ranging bilateral agreeme limitations on any agreement and may cause the Messecretary of Commerce Hernandez advocates a framhave a harder time selling it than GATT membership	xicans to drag their feet on negotiations. ework agreement, but he probably will
that Mexico stands to gain little.	a number of cabinet 25X1
members have already expressed their opposition to a wide-ranging agreement. The	
strongest adversaries are Foreign Secretary Sepulved	la and Secretary of Programming and
Budget Salinas, both of whom	would almost certainly oppose 25X1
lifting restrictions on foreign investment. We believe	that the Mexicans would be willing to
agree to consultation and dispute settlement procedu	ures and to fold intellectual property
rights into an agreement, but if they are pressed on	foreign investment, they probably will
stall the negotiations until the end of de la Madrid's	term. 25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707430001-9 Secret

Distribution:	
Original - A. Hughes (Commerce)	
1 - D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff	
1 - DDI	
1 - 0/DDI,	051/4
1 - LA/NIO	25X1
1 - A. Vila, Commerce	
1 - M. Coile, Commerce	
1 - C. Klein, USTR	
1 - T. Bennet, USTR	
1 - N. Lee, Treasury	
1 - NIC/AG	
1 - PDB Staff	
1 - C/DDI/PES	
1 - DDI/CPAS/ISS	
1 - D/ALA	
1 - ALA/PS	
1 - ALA/Research Director	
1 - CPAS/IMC/CB	
1 - D/OGI	
1 - C/SRD/OGI	
1 - C/PRB/OGI	
1 - C/MCD	
3 - C/MX	
1 - MX Files	•
AT A (NOD /Non-ton /	
ALA/MCD/Mexico/ 10CT86	25 X 1

25X1

Secret